Here and here I take Michelle Russell at her word and compose the most horrible blog post(s) ever. She’s right: to allow yourself to write a horrible blog post has a therapeutic character. I had neglected my humble blog for several months and needed a way back in. Here it is. I should add that I discovered Russell’s post only after I composed and posted my horrible contributions. I take my decision to just start writing combined with Russell’s post as a sign from the dark forces who rule our universe: It is OK to suck.
Why do these posts suck? I write no introductions; I arrive at no general conclusions. I develop no sense of context. Instead I post excerpts of the original text and interpolate comments in the form of enumerated paragraphs. What I produce in both cases are close readings, the lowest form of scholarship. What I hope to do is to gather a set of Obama speeches and remarks over the coming weeks to try to detect patterns in his message formation. The close readings will serve as a basis. Or more likely I will forget this project and move on to another. We shall see.
yours &c.
g.
In an interview with Business Week’s [BW] Editor-in-Chief Stephen J. Adler, and Washington Bureau Chief Jane Sasseen, U.S. President Obama lays out his theory of a “post-bubble growth model”:
[...] I’ll try to be specific. The last lunch that I had, I guess we had the CEOs of Xerox (XRX), AT&T (T), Honeywell (HON), and Coke (KO). We talked about the fact that, in the 1980s, when everybody was afraid Japan was going to eat our lunch, a lot of companies did a 180 in terms of quality improvement, efficiency, increasing productivity. There was a change in corporate culture that significantly boosted corporate productivity for a long time and helped create the boom of the ’90s [...]
Various responsa:
(1) Obama’s account draws on a familiar fabula. The re-engineering of the 80s passing into the boom of the 90s, a story he embeds it in his account of a lunch with CEOs.
Aside: The CEOs Obama cites were charged for their lunches.
(2) Obama’s narrative of pain passing into prosperity is different from others in that the agents are “companies” who decide on rational grounds to improve quality, efficiency, and productivity. For Obama the story is a celebration of political agency; the problem of a successful competitor is resolved through decisions that pass into policy.
(3) The account that passes into popular culture in films like Stone’s Wall Street (Gordon Gekko) or Marshall’s Pretty Woman (Richard Gere plays a corporate raider who reclaims his soul). Here would be the counter-story to the Obama account: The financial services revolution that begins in the late 70s takes the form of novel financial instruments that allow newly organized capital firms to buy up underperforming and therefore undervalued enterprises. Whether liquidated, down-sized, moved off-shore, or “re-engineered,” the process always released capital and sometimes resulted in more efficient operations. But the social costs to workers and communities were enormous.
(4) This story is not just at odds with Obama’s account. It is the antithesis of Obama’s account. This story is about the evaporation of corporate capital (from equity to debt) as it began to pass into the evaporation of consumer capital (the crash in savings rates), an historical process with no precise agents or agency. This is, therefore, not the story of a post-bubble model of development. This is precisely the opposite of a story about any post-bubble model of development. This is the story of the crash, release of capital, and consolidation that occurs when a bubble bursts.
Back to the President:
[...] What [CEOs] pointed out was, there were a couple of sectors that were resistant to that: health care, education, energy, and government [...]
(5) In Obama’s account other agents or agencies in other sectors resist the trends of rationalization and productivity.
(6) Education and health care are two sectors where the consumers of the service are not the primary payers for the service. Hence prices are inconsistent with the general rate of inflation. College and university administrators raise their tuitions and fees when federal or state governments legislate new subsidies. Public schools spend what local governments budget for them to spend. These two sectors are largely insulated from crash and consolidation. They are not subject to the same immediate market or consumer pressures.
(7) Education and health care are also services. They do not make things. The productivity revolution of the 80s and 90s occurred primarily in manufacturing or in business processes that could be rationalized. An example might be WalMart’s innovations in logistics and supplier-relations. An organization’s efficiency or productivity is a function of what an organization must consume or expend to produce results. The fewer the workers, the less the fixed or circulating capital, the more efficient the organization.
This is not the case in education and healthcare. What would innovation in the delivery of education look like? Distance instruction? A Harvard education for all? I critique that notion here. What would an innovation in the delivery of healthcare look like? Innovations in the business processes that support medical professionals like the standardized electronic records keeping that Obama proposes? Will that return savings? Consider any database. The front-end costs of getting data into any database are enormous.
The irony here is that innovation in the delivery of health care is almost a constant. New technology and new technique enters practical use almost daily. But it does not follow that quality or consumer choice returns lower prices. It can return just the opposite.
(8) The U.S. energy sector since the 1970s has been reduced to a de facto public utility. Domestic production of petroleum is suppressed; refinery capacity remains what it has been for 30 years. Efficiency gains in the discovery, delivery, and use of energy have followed the price curve. There has been almost no investment in nuclear power since the 1970s. The story of the U.S. energy sector has been one of cheap oil from the supply shock of the 1970s to the more recent supply shock.
(9) Obama includes Government in his list of sectors that resist the trend toward productivity. But Obama has made no move nor has he announced any plan to rationalize the delivery of Government services, reform existing entitlements, eliminate un- or under-performing agencies. This is where Obama could probably recruit bi-partisan support.
Back to the President:
[...] And so if you think about the problem that we’re now trying to solve, we’ve stopped the bleeding, the economy is stabilized. There’s this huge deleveraging taking place, both at the consumer level and among businesses, and, ultimately, government’s going to have to do the same thing. We’re not going to be able to drive the next big stretch of economic growth through debt [...]
(10) How does Obama propose to deleverage the U.S. government?
[...] So what is that model of a post-bubble economy? What we’ve tried to say is that there are some foundations, some pillars that have to be in place in order for that next round of growth to take off. This is not to pick winners and losers and be able to predict exactly, in detail, which companies are going to be successful and which aren’t. This is always the straw man that gets put up there when you hear about government being involved in the economy. That’s not what we’re talking about [...]
(11) Obama’s pillars include energy, health care, and education. I wonder who is arguing that Obama wants to pick winners and losers?
[What we're saying] matches up almost perfectly with what those CEOs were saying: Can we introduce the same sort of productivity in the health-care industry, which we know is going to be a growing sector because of the aging population? Can we use the need to transition our energy economy in such a way that it ends up being a huge engine for economic growth? Can we revamp our education system so that it’s producing the kind of workers we need? And then can we make government sufficiently efficient so that it not only is delivering good services for taxpayer dollars but also regains credibility? Because in the 21st century economy, a lean, mean, but effective government is going to be important. And we need to get beyond this notion that somehow government is always just the problem [...]
(12) With respect to health care, Obama asks if we can introduce the same sort of productivity that obtains in other sectors. We probably can. At least with respect to business processes like record keeping. Will this return significant savings? Probably not. Hospital managers and administrators attempt to eke out savings where they can every day. The price pressures on health care consist not in administrative costs but in the price of highly skilled practitioners, the tools that they use, and, significantly, the insurance they must carry.
But this misses the point. The savings that Obama wants will not be realized by the consumer; it will be used to cover the uninsured. This is the core contradiction of health care reform as proposed. The sector is accused of fraud, waste, and abuse; the goal, however, is universal coverage. One does not follow from the other.
(13) With respect to the energy sector, Obama’s policy goals take the form of cap and trade legislation currently dormant in the U.S. Senate. Cap and trade is a value-add or VAT tax. The theory behind it is this: if we raise the costs of carbon emissions, then renewable sources of energy become cost effective. Further, innovation and investment will follow to drive down the high cost of renewable sources of energy. Hence, a clean energy economy. Hence, green jobs. Even if I were to accept this argument, it does not follow from Obama’s premise that the energy sector stands in want of a productivity revolution. This is the very antithesis of a productivity revolution. This would be to depress a productive sector to release the capital necessary to develop a less productive sector. But to depress the productive sector in advance of the innovation and investment necessary to develop the non-productive sector will result in general price inflation as the cost of everything–food, consumer goods, transportation, housing–goes up.
This legislation may be good for the environment. But it has nothing to do with productivity. The opposite is the case.
(14) About education. What has Obama proposed to make the sector more productive; to use less to produce more? To drive down the property taxes that fund public schools or the tuitions for private schools, colleges, and universities? What does producing more even mean in this case? What Obama has proposed is further investment, further subsidy. As I argue in (6) and here it is the subsidies themselves that drives up costs.
[...] And so I actually think that some of these conversations that I have with corporate leaders, as well as with small business leaders, there’s a real recognition of, rather than be bogged down in the old ideological debates, the whole question is how do we create a smarter economy? And if we don’t do that, then we’re going to be limping along with unsatisfactory growth rates for a pretty long period of time [...]
(15) How do we create a smarter economy? How do we create an economy at all? We buy and sell goods and services. In the process we negotiate value. Productivity can return lower prices. It can also return higher quality while prices remain stable. But productivity does not return growth; it returns intensity and not without cost in terms of displaced workers or the liquidation of un- or under-performing organizations. It is innovation that returns growth in the form of new products or services. But it does so at a high social cost as even high-performing actors get liquidated. This is the story of the 1980s. Innovation in the form of novel financial instruments used to re-organize or liquidate un- or under-performing organizations.
(16) It is ironic that Obama would cite this era as his model.
It is ironic in that he does not propose to allow un- or under-performing organizations to be liquidated as would be the case if the question were one of productivity; rather, he proposes the opposite, broad expansion in education, health care, and in renewable sources of energy.
It is ironic in that he imagines that the productivity gains of the 80s and 90s to have been the result of rational deliberation among an elite of corporate actors (CEOs, presumably, since it is in the context of a lunch with CEOs that the story arises) as opposed to market and historical forces that none of the elites of the era anticipated. (Compare how well the elites of our own era anticipated the recent crash and financial de-globalization.)
It is ironic in that while his energy sector legislation comprehends the economic activity of innovation, it turns the process upside down. With cap and trade it is not innovation that drives growth; it is “growth” in the form of supressing a productive sector to subsidize an under-performing sector that will return imagined innovation. Is there any historical precedent for this upside down model of development?
yours &c.,
g.
“Dow drops below 7,000 for first time since 1997,” writes Tim Paradis, AP Business Writer.
Paradis continues:
Dow breaks 7,000 for first time since ‘97 as AIG gets more gov’t funding, posts $61.7B loss [...]
The market has lost half its value since its high of 14,000 in October 2007. Meanwhile, governors of bankrupt U.S. states form a conga line at a posh White House soiree, as reported by Darlene Superville in an Associated Press release titled Obama kicks up White House entertaining.
yours &c.
g.
history accelerates: can the U.S. service its debt?—U.S. treasuries fall for third day
On Tuesday of this week the U.S. president addressed a joint session of Congress. Today, Thursday, the U.S. president released his multi-trillion US$ budget with its attendant US$1.75 trillion projected deficit, “or 12.3% of the gross domestic product, a level not seen since 1942 as the U.S. plunged into World War II,” as reported by Jonathan Weisman of the Wall Street Journal in a release titled Obama Budget Pushes Sweeping Change. The markets for their part are not just registering their disapproval of U.S. policy as recently articulated. The markets are balking. They’re actively resisting as the U.S. attempts to auction off its debt.
[...] “Apparently the markets think that U.S. risk of sovereign default is steadily creeping up,” writes Alex Salkever in a Microaxis blog burst titled Doomsday Scenario: Could U.S. default on its national debt?
Hedge fund blogger Zero Hedge puts up the numbers here. According to the numbers from finance calculator company Markit, U.S. is a greater default risk than Japan or Germany, among others.
A default would destroy the U.S. economy and TARP recipients, in particular [...]
[...] “The U.S. is borrowing so much that it may have trouble paying the money back, said Jaemin Cheong, a bond trader in Seoul at Industrial Bank of Korea, the nation’s largest lender to small- and mid-sized companies,” writes Susanne Walker in a www.bloomberg.com release titled U.S. Treasuries Fall for Third Day on Spending, Supply Concern
“Yields are headed higher,” Cheong said in an interview. “More issuance will be needed to support the economy. The possibility of default is more and more as time passes.”
The government is depending on overseas investors to help fund its $787 billion economic plan. China is the largest overseas holder of Treasuries, with $696.2 billion, followed by Japan, with $578.3 billion.
The administration forecast gross domestic product to shrink 1.2 percent in 2009, followed by 3.2 percent expansion in 2010. That’s more optimistic than economists’ estimates for a 2 percent contraction this year and 1.8 percent growth next year, according to the median forecast in a Bloomberg News survey.
The White House forecast an annual average yield for 10-year Treasury notes of 2.8 percent this year and 4 percent in 2010 [...]
This could all reverse itself tomorrow. This is a data point without a trend line. The question the sovereign wealth funds need to ask themselves is where else in the world can they park their cash reserves? The Obama administration has bet everything on their answer.
yours &c.
g.

